Approved for Release: 2018/04/17 C06571787

Secret

(b)(3)

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

(b)(3)

Secret

50

13 January 1967
No. 0272/67

Approved for Release: 2018/04/17 C06571787

Approved for Release: 2018/04/17 C06571787

SUKARNO STATEMENT FAILS TO SATISFY OPPONENTS

President Sukarno's evasive 10 January statement concerning his role in the abortive Indonesian coup attempt of October 1965 is likely to lead to an intensification of demands for his ouster.

Sukarno, in his brief statement, refused to recognize the pre-eminent constitutional authority of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS)--Indonesia's policy-making body--or to condemn the Communist Party (PKI) as the regime had wanted him to do. He denied any responsibility for the attempted coup and the economic and moral decline in Indonesia.

Sukarno said that his own investigation of the 1 October incident showed that it was brought about by three factors--Communist leadership, neocolonialist and imperialist subversion, and the existence of "undesirable elements" in Indonesia. He reiterated that the events of 1 October were a "complete surprise" to him.

This unsatisfactory statement will provide added ammunition for those who want to mount an accelerated campaign against Sukarno. Even before it was issued, ten "action fronts" had demanded that the MPRS remove him from office, and three popular newspapers had highlighted some of his financial manipulations.

Despite the prospects of increased activist pressures, indications are that General Suharto will continue to move with deliberation and to rely on constitutional methods. Parliament will reassemble on 23 January and may be asked to call a special session of the MPRS, which could then vote on some means to remove Sukarno from office.

In the meantime Suharto may proceed with his long-pending plans to enlarge parliament by appointing 110 new members from groups regarded as anti-Sukarno. Since parliament is part of the MPRS, this would also ensure a more responsive congress.

Although the regime and its supporters seem agreed on the need to oust Sukarno, plans for doing so appear flexible and open-ended. (b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2018/04/17 C06571787